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F. D. Maurice: The Man Who Re-wrote the Book 
(Presidential Address given at the 2002 Annual General 
Meeting of the MacDonald Society)
Stephen Prickett
 ometime during the eighteenth century there occurred in England 
one of those momentous sea-changes in reading that permanently altered 
the way in which books, whether sacred or secular, were understood 
and interpreted. The effectiveness of the new approach, and its success in 
obliterating its predecessor, can be judged by the fact that we are now hardly 
conscious of it ever having taken place at all. What makes it very different from 
previous appropriations is that it was not the work of any organised party or 
faction, and it was only in retrospect that a theory of reading emerged to justify 
what had happened.
	 Though	one	can	find	examples	enough	of	realistic	secular	narrative	
fiction	in	the	seventeenth	century,	it	was	probably	not	until	the	extraordinary	
success of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe in 1719 that one becomes aware of how 
the new art-form, the so-called “novel,” was altering not merely standards 
of realism, but—less obviously, though in the long run perhaps even more 
importantl —also the way in which other kinds of narrative were being read 
and understood. That such a new and, for a long time, low-status form of 
entertainment could or should affect the reading of God’s Word would no doubt 
have seemed utterly incredible to contemporaries. Only with hindsight can such 
changes	be	seen	to	have	happened,	and	explanations	sought.	Indeed,	only	since	
Hans Frei’s pioneering work, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, appeared some 
twenty	five	years	ago,	have	we	learned	to	see	the	rise	of	biblical	criticism	in	
relation to what was happening in the contemporary novel.
 The details of Frei’s argument need not concern us here, but two of 
the results are beyond dispute. What happened, in short, was that the Bible—and 
in particular the Old Testament—ceased to be read as though it spoke with a 
single omniscient dogmatic voice (what one might call the authoritative voice of 
God), and began instead to be read as dialogue, with a plurality of competing 
voices (as it were, the voices of people). At the same time, what had been 
universally accepted as an essentially polysemous narrative, with many threads 
of meaning, was narrowed into a single thread of story, which was almost 
invariably	interpreted	as	being	“historical.”	Thus	we	find	a	very	ordinary	
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biblical commentary of 1805, Mrs Trimmer’s Hints to the Unlearned in the 
Study of the Holy Scripture, writing of God as if he is “author” not just of the 
Bible, but of His whole creation, whose human protagonists are somehow 
characters in the plot: [end of page 1]
           The Books that follow, as far as the BOOK OF ESTHER, are 
	 										called	the	HISTORICAL	BOOKS.	The	Histories	they	contain	
           differ from all the other histories that ever were written, for they 
	 										give	an	account	of	the	ways	of	GOD;	and	explain	why GOD 
           protected and rewarded some persons and nations, and why he 
           punished others; also, what led particular persons mentioned in 
           Scripture to do certain things for which they were approved of 
           condemned; whereas writers who compose histories in a common 
           way, without being inspired of God, can only form guesses and 
           conjectures concerning God’s dealings with mankind, neither can 
           they know what passed in the hearts of those they write about; such 
           knowledge as this, belongs to God alone, whose ways are 
           unsearchable and past finding out, and to whom all hearts are open, 
           all desires known! (iii)
Nor	was	this	a	one-way	influence.	If	the	Bible	was	now	being	read	as	the	
supreme novel, novelists from Jane Austen to George MacDonald were 
incorporating	biblical	techniques	and	symbolism	into	their	fictional	structures.
	 That,	however,	is	running	ahead	of	ourselves.	I	want	today	to	look	
at	a	much	more	unlikely	figure	in	this	story	of	the	re-reading	of	the	Bible:	
Frederick Denison Maurice. His name is unlikely to be a major one in either 
standard histories of biblical criticism, or in histories of the novel, but not least 
of the reasons for that omission are the conventions of scholarship that separate 
two modes of reading that were historically very deeply intertwined. Maurice 
was one of the very few of his generation to see that historical interconnection, 
and to understand its implications for the future of biblical interpretation—
implications	that,	I	would	argue,	are	if	anything	more	significant	today	than	they	
were even in his own time.
 We start with the common ground between the Bible and the novel: 
narrative	itself.	Christianity,	we	must	remember,	provided	the	original grand 
narrative. Unlike either Judaism, or the various pagan cults it had supplanted 
in the late Roman world, for more than a thousand years the worship of 
Christ	seemed	to	its	adherents	to	offer	the	added	bonus	of	a	final	and	
coherent Theory of Everything. This fundamental consilience (to use E. O. 
Wilson’s re-coined word) included not merely the dramatic sweep of the Bible 
narrative	itself,	beginning	with	the	Creation	and	ending	with	the	Apocalypse;	
but cosmology, botany, zoology, and even secular literature itself could be 
integrated	into	a	single	vast	all-encompassing	system.	In	its	most	developed	
form not merely human society, but animals, plants, minerals, and even angels 
themselves,	were	arranged	in	a	divinely	ordered	Great	Chain	of	Being	whose	
golden links reached from the throne of God to the lowliest inanimate parts of 
Creation.1 The earth-centred Ptolemaic universe, the providential powers of 
medicinal herbs, and the hierarchies of mediaeval bestiaries, all bore witness to 
the divine scheme of the [2] universe. The very completeness of the narrative 
by the late middle ages had made the idea of an alternative story almost 
unthinkable.
	 Even	the	one	apparent	cultural	exception	to	this	order,	the	literature	
of classical antiquity, was ingeniously incorporated into this great universal 
narrative.	As	early	as	the	first	century,	Philo,	a	Hellenised	Jew,	claimed	that	the	
Greek philosophers such as Plato were not merely compatible with the Hebrew 
scriptures,	but	had	actually	been	influenced	by	them.2 Other commentators 
applied	to	classical	literature	the	same	allegorising	techniques	that	had	first	been	
used	in	the	Christian	appropriation	of	the	Old	Testament.	Virgil’s	fourth	
Eclogue, with its prophecy of a coming ruler, was understood as a foretelling 
of	Christ	and	a	parallel	to	Isaiah.	His	Aeneid was even read as a parable of the 
Christian	soul’s	journey	through	life.	By	the	sixth	century	Cassiodorus	was	able	
to accommodate the whole of classical learning to an organised programme of 
Christian	education	(Prickett,	Reading 5-7).	Thus	sanctified,	the	classics	were	
embraced by the Renaissance writers as religious authorities almost on a par 
with	the	biblical	writers.	Dante	makes	the	pagan	Virgil	his	guide	through	a	
Christian	Hell	and	Purgatory	that	contains	both	biblical	and	classical	figures.	
Milton, in Samson Agonistes, creates a classical tragedy out of a biblical 
story—reminding us in his prologue that “The Apostle Paul thought it not 
unworthy	to	insert	a	verse	of	Euripides	into	the	text	of	Holy	Scripture,	I	Cor.	15.	
33.” “[O]f the style and uniformity and that commonly called the plot . . . they 
only will be best judge who are not unacquainted with Aeschylus, Sophocles, 
and Euripides, the three tragic poets unequalled yet by any, and the best rule to 
all who endeavour to write tragedy” (365; 367). All human learning: literature, 
art, science and religion, could be seen as being in perfect harmony.
	 Like	all	such	generalisations,	this	is	of	course	an	oversimplification.	
No	synthesis	of	this	magnitude	and	complexity	is	univocal,	or	tells	only	one	
story. Even that musical image of “harmony” implies at least different voices or 
instruments playing related parts within a single tune. Another analogy might be 
that of a thick rope composed of many individual narrative strands. Perhaps the 
best metaphor of all would be that of a Kuhnian paradigm. Within a common 
overall way of thinking there could be wide areas of disagreement. Aquinas’ 
great Summa Theologica, now often seen as the supreme statement of the 
mediaeval synthesis, was sharply attacked, and even seen as heretical, in its own 
time.	Like	the	Bible	itself,	the	grand	story	of	the	universe	was	less	a	single	
narrative than a collection of inter-related stories on a common theme. What 
finally	broke	this	paradigm,	however,	was	not	any	single	point	of	debate,	but	
rather the collapse of the idea that a total common synthesis was possible at all.
	 In	the	wake	of	the	Reformation	and	the	disappearance	of	the	old	
Ptolemaic idea of the earth at the centre of all things, the tensions underlying 
the always [3] fragile mediaeval synthesis became more visible. As in other 
examples	of	intellectual	paradigms,	there	had	been	a	kind	of	tacit	symbiosis	
between the various parts. The self-evident truth of one piece of the argument 
seemed to reinforce other areas that may have been logically unrelated. Similarly, 
when one piece collapsed, other, apparently unrelated, parts of the synthesis 
suddenly seemed less obviously right. The notion of the inherent connection 
between	knowledge	and	morality,	for	instance,	was	never	a	central	Christian	
doctrine per se, but its loss nevertheless weakened the idea that there had to 
be	a	single,	discernible,	pattern	to	the	universe.	Once	the	idea	of	a	unified	grand	
narrative in this sense was questioned, it fell to pieces almost under its own 
entropic momentum.
 This was not simply a matter of ideas. A prevailing paradigm may 
represent	itself	at	any	stage	to	its	adherents	as	primarily	a	unified	intellectual	
construct, but, as those who dare to challenge it quickly discover, it is also a 
locus	of	deeply	entrenched	emotions.	Both	the	Reformation	and	the	Catholic	
Counter-Reformation	had	liberated	huge	new	reserves	of	spiritual	energy	and	
devotion	in	Europe,	and	in	both	Calvinism	and	the	new	Catholic	baroque	
sensibility what looked like new and satisfying versions of the traditional all-
embracing grand narrative had been painfully re-constructed. Yet the greater 
the	vigour	of	the	polemic	against	supposedly	“Christian”	opponents,	the	more	
both sides were reminded that there was another possible version of events. 
The	universal	paradigm	had	gone.	In	place	of	a	single	Church	there	were	
warring sects; in place of the traditional synthesis was nascent pluralism. Not 
unrelatedly, perhaps, by the eighteenth century religious observance in England, 
France, and Germany had sunk to lows that have never been equalled either 
before, or, perhaps more surprisingly, since.3
 Such changes in collective sensibility, however, rarely have single 
or	simple	causes.	The	collapse	of	the	traditional	Christian	paradigm	itself	
attracted a variety of new narratives: words like “Reformation” or “heresy” 
are themselves titles of implied narratives of heroic revolt, or triumphant 
fidelity.	Other	interpretations	of	European	history	tell	other	stories.	One	strand	of	
conventional wisdom, for instance, has it that the old providential grand narrative 
was	finally	demolished	by	three	great	historical	blows.	The	first,	the	belief	that	
we	lived	on	the	central	body	of	a	limited	cosmos	was	destroyed	by	Copernicus,	
Galileo	and	Newton	in	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries.	The	second,	the	
biblical	tradition	that	man	was	uniquely	formed	in	God’s	image	was	exploded	
by	Darwin	in	the	nineteenth	century,	and,	finally,	any	assumptions	of	intellectual	
rationality	bolstered	by	the	first	two	were	rudely	shattered	by	Freud	at	the	turn	
of the twentieth century. [4] One problem with this account, however, is its 
dating. No intellectual revolution happens all at once, but the traditional belief in 
the uniqueness of humanity was already being treated with great scepticism by 
the middle of the eighteenth century, a hundred years before Darwin, who did 
no more than administer the coup de grace. Another problem is its source: this 
is, after all, the version put about by Freud himself, who was, not very subtly, 
attempting to piggy-back his own “revolution” on the prestige of the other two 
and	claim	the	same	status	in	the	history	of	thought	as	Copernicus	and	Darwin	
(326). A third problem is that, as has been argued, the fact of the breakdown of 
the	entire	system	was	itself	probably	more	significant	than	the	questioning	of	
any particular part.
 Even by the seventeenth century we are already looking not at a single 
narrative but a profusion of incompatible and competing ones. Moreover, it is 
significant	how	so	many	other	makers	and	shakers	of	human	ideas	do	not	seem	
to have reacted to these blows with the horror and dismay that Freud evidently 
felt	they	should.	If,	in	the	early	seventeenth	century,	John	Donne	genuinely	
felt that “the new philosophy puts all in doubt” (questions of irony prevent an 
unambiguous	reading),	certainly,	a	full	century	after	Copernicus’	death,	Milton	
—who not merely knew perfectly well that the earth went round the sun, but also 
believed the material of his great saga of the Fall of Man, Paradise Lost, to be 
divinely revealed in the Book of Genesis—calmly uses the obsolete earth-centred 
cosmos as the setting for his poem. Similarly, though science may well have 
contributed	to	the	growth	of	eighteenth-century	Deism,	we	exaggerate	its	
importance at that period if we attribute the scepticism of the Enlightenment 
solely	or	even	principally	to	the	scientific	revolution.	There	were	many	other	
philosophical, religious, and social roots to the Enlightenment, and Newton’s 
theory of gravity, for instance, was not even accepted in France until the mid-
years of the century. The publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859 
certainly shook the faith of some, including, for instance, the journalist 
and editor John Morely, who later admitted that he had changed his mind 
about ordination as a result of Darwin. But the frisson that is supposed to have 
shaken the entire religious world loses some of its chill when we read actual 
eye-witness	accounts	of	the	clearly	very	confused	debate	between	Huxley	and	
Bishop Wilberforce at the Pitt-Rivers Museum, or notice that neither Maurice 
nor	Newman,	both	in	their	own	ways	far	more	significant	figures	than	the	
meretricious “soapy” Sam Wilberforce, seem to have been disturbed, either 
publicly or privately, by the new biological theory.
 The changes brought about just by the breakdown of the idea of a single 
system	of	explanation—a	single	grand	narrative—also	resulted	in	corresponding	
linguistic	shifts,	first	in	English,	but	within	a	century	right	across	Europe.	As	the	
historian Peter Harrison has recently shown, the word “religion” only acquired 
[5] its modern meaning of a particular systemised code of belief and practice 
in England in the seventeenth century, as the breakdown of the mediaeval 
synthesis,	and	the	religious	upheavals	of	the	sixteenth-century	Reformation,	
allowed	people,	for	almost	the	first	time,	to	see	that	more than one such system 
could	exist.	Only	then	could	a	“religion”	be	perceived	as	one	system	among	
several, that could be studied as it were objectively, from the outside. Only then 
did the word acquire its plural form.4	In	that	sense,	our	concept	of	religion	is	
itself only about three hundred years old.
	 Characteristically,	the	Protestantism	that	was	to	emerge	from	the	
Reformation	struggles	was	not	a	single	dogmatically	unified	Church,	but	a	
sprawling	variety	of	conflicting	groups,	all	in	fact	“religions”	in	the	new	sense	
of	the	word:	self-confessed	sects,	in	that	they	defined	their	constituency	in	terms	
of	exclusion.	Some	other	groups—whether	Catholics,	nonconformists,	the	un-
righteous	or	un-elect—were	by	definition	ineligible	for	membership,	or,	more	
importantly,	for	the	Lord’s	Salvation.	All,	including	even	those	who	claimed	
to	represent	the	historic	and	pre-Reformation	Anglican	tradition,	now	defined	
themselves not so much as custodians of an all-embracing truth but in relation to 
other	religious	movements,	other	systems,	with	whom	they	were	in	conflict.
	 Oddly,	almost	the	sole	exception	to	this	was	a	body	whose	origins	
seemed to most people to be identical with other seventeenth-century millenarian 
sects: the “Society of Friends.” Even the name by which they were normally 
known, the “Quakers,” seemed to place them with the Ranters and the 
Shakers,	and	there	was	little	in	the	verbal	violence	of	George	Fox’s	and	John	
Woolman’s orations to suggest otherwise. Yet by the late eighteenth century 
their continuing membership had achieved a level of education and prosperity 
that marked them out as being superior to most other nonconformists and many 
Anglicans.	Great	Quaker	families,	the	Frys,	the	Rowntrees,	and	the	Cadburys	
dominated the relatively new chocolate trade; the Barclays were big in other 
growth-areas such as banking and brewing. With such striking innovations as 
equal	education	for	their	women	(Ackworth,	in	Yorkshire,	was	the	first	co-
educational boarding school in the world), and new forms of treatment for the 
mentally ill (The Retreat, in York), the Quakers by the end of the eighteenth 
century were pioneering a new total vision of society. Only the Unitarians came 
close to them in educating women.
 What was theologically interesting about the Quakers, however, was 
their total absence of theology in the normal sense. Their one and only “doctrine,” 
if it may be so called, was that of the “inner light”: that we have within us our 
own source of spiritual guidance and enlightenment that must take primacy over 
any	externally	imposed	system	of	belief	or	morality.	While	outsiders	have	been	
quick to see in this obvious dangers of self-deceit and corruption, something 
in the [6] Quaker way has enabled the sect to continue and even thrive over 
the succeeding years in a way few other mystically inclined groups have done, 
while adapting without undue pain to later intellectual developments. At 
the	same	time	they	have	never	been	numerous	or	had	any	significant	appeal	
outside educated middle-class intellectual circles: present estimates of British 
membership	are	static	at	around	the	twenty	thousand	figure.	Nevertheless,	in	
the	eighteenth	century,	their	stress	on	the	inwardness	of	religious	experience,	
combined	with	their	refusal	to	attempt	to	construct	any	kind	of	external	grand	
narrative at all, placed them in a unique position in the spectrum of religious 
belief.
	 While	avoiding	the	obvious	dangers	of	adherence	to	a	fixed	world-
picture in a society of rapid change, the Quakers in effect gave instead complete 
centrality	to	the	inner	narrative.	They	were	not,	of	course,	the	first	to	see	their	
lives in such a way, but by completely discarding the conventional contemporary 
structure	of	external	defining	narratives,	they	gave	a	new	kind	of	stress	to	their	
internal	life.	Because	such	a	narrative,	by	definition,	embraced	their	whole	
lives,	describing	every	part	of	their	existence,	Christianity	could	be	thus	re-
constituted within them as a personal grand narrative. Even if it could not 
explain	every	external	thing	in	the	way	that	the	mediaeval	world-picture	had	
done, it could contain ironies and uncertainties, even the kind of unconscious 
drives and contradictions later claimed by Freud or Jung. And it could not be 
fazed	by	new	discoveries	in	science	or	biblical	criticism.	In	that	sense,	at	least,	
it was consonant with the new philosophy being developed by Kant and his 
idealist successors in Germany, as well as with the new ideals of sentiment and 
subjectivity growing in England and France. Above all, it was essentially 
pluralistic.
	 It	is,	therefore,	significant	that	the	greatest	nineteenth	century	attempt	at	
reconstructing	a	universal	Christian	narrative,	Maurice’s	The Kingdom of Christ 
(1838),	was	subtitled	“Flints	to	a	Quaker	Respecting	the	Principles,	Constitution	
and	Ordinances	of	the	Catholic	Church,”	and	(in	its	first	edition)	was	arranged	
as	a	series	of	letters	to	a	Quaker.	It	was	a	remarkable	book	by	any	standards	
—threatening	an	apotheosis	of	the	Church	of	England	so	radical	that	(to	invert	
Arnold’s aphorism) Anglicans have ever since neither been able to live with it, 
nor live without it.5	Yet	Maurice	had	not	even	been	brought	up	in	the	Church	of	
England. Born and raised a Unitarian, he had for a time in adolescence been 
strongly	influenced	by	his	mother’s	growing	Calvinism	(Life 28-31). Though 
both	Unitarianism	and	Calvinism	were	passing	phases,	later	transcended,	there	is	
a sense in which the two positions remained as lifelong poles in his thought. The 
former,	with	its	denial	of	the	divinity	of	Jesus,	and	a	strong	scientific	tradition	
among its members, was closer to Deism in its general tenor than traditional 
Anglicanism. For many Unitarians, the Book of Nature was as important as 
biblical	Revelation.	Calvinism,	on	the	other	hand,	was	fiercely	anti-naturalistic,	
[7] sceptical as to both human judgement and knowledge, and stressing the 
inscrutability of God’s ways. Thus The Kingdom of Christ combines	an	extreme	
theological	liberalism	and	openness	(following	Coleridge’s	principle	that	people	
are	more	usually	right	in	what	they	affirm	than	in	what	they	deny)	with	an	
exalted	view	of	the	Church	as	the	means	of	personal	salvation.
	 For	Maurice	the	Church	is	a	“universal	spiritual	society.”	The	two	
qualities	are	co-dependent.	Ironically,	it	can	only be universal if it is spiritual. 
No other kind of society could embrace everyone. But it could only be spiritual 
if it were universal. For him openness is at the heart of the New Testament; 
exclusiveness	is	quite	simply	incompatible with	spirituality.	If	at	present	these	
conditions were potential rather than actual, that is because the universal 
spiritual	society	was	in	a	state	of	slow	evolution.	Its	“truth”	has	been	“working	
itself out into clearness for many centuries” through a “strange and painful 
process”	(2.75).	Christianity	is	not	a	system	possessing	a	set	of	clear-cut	ideas	at	
all.	It	would,	Maurice	writes,	be	“hard	to	establish	in	a	court	of	law	the	identity	
of the dogmas of the New Testament with those which prevailed in Scotland 
and Germany during the eighteenth century” (1.159).
	 It	follows	that	a	“gathered	church”	of	like-minded	believers	is	a	
contradiction	in	terms.	The	model	for	the	Church	is	not	a	group	who	share	
common beliefs, but a family—whose members are bound by deeper ties than 
verbal	formulae.	The	Patriarchs	of	Genesis	were	first	and	foremost	relatives.	The	
story of Jacob, argued Maurice, witnesses to the fact that God’s people were 
founded on family relationship and not choice (1.275). Moreover, the vigour of 
this unique society actually depends on the necessary tensions within it. Just as 
at a linguistic level the Bible is charged with a metaphorical tension by which the 
concepts of family and fatherhood acquire a new meaning from the uses to 
which	they	are	put,	so	the	perpetual	tension	between	the	Church	as	an	outward	
physical organisation and an inner spiritual society re-shapes our ideas of what it 
means to be both an organisation and a spiritual society. Maurice’s chosen title 
illustrates this tension. The “kingship” and “fatherhood” of God are inescapable 
poles	of	Christian	experience.	The	“kingdom”	of	Christ	is a “family.” The 
deepest writings of the New Testament, instead of being digests of doctrine, are 
epistles,	explaining	to	those	who	had	been	admitted	into	the	Church	of	Christ	
their own position (1.296).
	 Though	in	retrospect	it	might	seem	that	Maurice’s	vision	of	the	Church	
represents	the	only	viable	attempt	to	create	anything	approaching	a	Christian	
grand	narrative	for	the	post-Kantian	era,	he	himself	would	have	been	horrified	
by the notion. For him an all-embracing narrative—in his terms, a “system”— 
was fatal to the pursuit of truth. [8]
           When once a man begins to build a system, the very gifts and 
           qualities which might serve in the investigation of truth, become the 
           greatest hindrances to it. He must make the different parts of the 
	 										scheme	fit	into	each	other,	his	dexterity	shown	not	in	detecting	facts	
           but in cutting them square. (Lectures 222)
A	“system,”	together	with	its	outward	political	and	ecclesiastical	expression,	
“parry,” was for him a mental and spiritual strait-jacket, permitting only pre- 
determined	gestures	towards	pre-defined	goals.	It	is	the	vehicle	of	the	second-	
hand,	holding	at	bay	all	genuine	possibilities	of	change.	It	is	the	enemy	of	
creativity.	In	contrast,	following	Coleridge,	what	he	called	“method”	was	the	
pre-condition	of	all	first-hand	experience.	Without	it,	impressions	and	intuitions	
were alike random and disorganised. “To me,” he wrote, “these words [‘system’ 
and ‘method’] seem not only not synonymous, but the greatest contraries 
imaginable: the one indicating that which is most opposed to life, freedom, 
variety;	and	the	other	that	without	which	they	cannot	exist”	(1.272-73).	The	
Bible	afforded	the	perfect	example	of	the	contrast.	The	systematiser	“is	
tormented every page he reads with a sense of the refractory and hopeless 
materials he has to deal with,” whereas the disinterested reader who does m 
approach	it	with	pre-conceptions	finds	a	unity	and	meaning	in	the	very	diversity	
of	its	contents.	It	is	“organic,”	providing	a	“principle	of	progression”	by	which	
we	move	from	the	known	to	the	unknown,	and	without	which	the	infinite	
possibilities	of	the	new	remain	unexplored	because	they	are	inaccessible.
	 Instead	of	seeking	a	satisfactory	“system”	of	biblical	interpretation,	
Maurice	invokes	the	creative	power	of	language	itself.	Criticising	the	
lexicographic	approach	to	language	which	he	sees	as	characteristic	of	Horne	
Tooke	or	Johnson,	Maurice	appeals	to	a	common	ground	of	experience	that	
echoes the radicalism of Schleiermacher’s Speeches on Religion:
	 										If	they	would	have	stooped	to	the	strong	and	irresistible	evidence	
           which the workings of our own minds, which all history, furnishes, 
	 										that	there	is	as	much	vital	principle	in	a	word	as	in	a	tree	or	a	flower,	
           they would have understood how it was possible that the root should 
           be a small ugly thing, and that yet it should contain in itself the 
	 										whole	power	and	principle	of	the	leaves,	and	buds,	and	flowers,	
	 										into	which	it	afterwards	expands	.	.	..	They	would	have	
           understood too, how the peculiar circumstances of any age, moral 
	 										or	political,	like	the	influence	of	sun	and	air,	of	spring	breezes,	
           of mildew and blight, may modify the form and colour of a word, 
           may stint or quicken its growth, may give it a full-blown, coarse, 
          material look, cause it to sicken into a pale and drooping 
          abstraction, or strengthen it in all its spiritual sap and juices. 
           (Friendship 53) [9] 
This approach to language as a living, organic and essentially narrative entity is 
central to any understanding of Maurice’s mode of thought. He himself was fully 
aware of its quite startling implications: 
	 									In	using	this	language	I	am	far	from	intending	to	be	
	 									metaphorical.	I	use	that	language	which	I	believe	does	most	
	 									literally	and	exactly	convey	my	meaning.	The	point	in	debate	
          is, whether words are endued with this principle of life, the 
          manifestations of which it is impossible in any way so truly to 
	 									express	as	in	language	of	outward	nature.	Whether	it	be	so	or	
	 									not,	I	repeat,	is	the	question.	To	call	this	language	metaphorical	
          is to beg the question. (Friendship 54)
	 Throughout	Maurice’s	thinking	he	takes	for	granted	the	Coleridgean	
principle that articulate knowledge is rooted in certainties and modes of 
awareness	that	extend	far	beneath	consciousness	to	layers	that	are	accessible	to	
aesthetic rather than rational or discursive forms of apprehension. Maurice’s 
Platonism	gave	him	a	new	gloss	to	Christ’s	sayings	about	the	need	for	a	childlike	
mind. As one friend wrote after a conversation with him in 1836, “Maurice says 
all little children are Platonists, and it is their education which makes them 
Aristotelians” (Life 1.207).
	 In	claiming	that	words	are	“endued”	with	“life,”	Maurice	is,	of	
course	echoing	Coleridge’s	well-known	affirmation	in Aids to Reflection that 
“words	are	not	THINGS,	they	are	LIVING	POWERS,	by	which	the	things	of	
most	importance	to	mankind	are	actuated,	combined	and	humanised”	(xvi).	This	
is not some kind of magical attribution, but rather the idea that words develop 
progressively	as	they	are	used,	constantly	being	adapted	and	changed	to	fit	new	
situations, yet always laden with the freight of their past history. At the same 
time,	they	reach	out	from	that	immediate	context	towards	something	that	is	other	
and transcendent.
 The ambiguity of language is thus, for Maurice, not a hindrance, 
but—given	the	complexity	and	richness	of	real	thinking	compared	with	
the	artificial	simplicities	of	philosophers	and	theologians—a	help	towards	
greater clarity. What has to be remembered, however, is that this is not so much 
a philosophical clarity, as a “poetic” or narrative clarity. Despite the way 
in which it has sometimes been used, the Bible is not a rule-book, nor yet a 
manifesto, but an on-going recursive story.
	 Here	the	influence	of	his	Cambridge	tutor,	Julius	Hare,	was	highly	
significant.	A	Fellow	of	Trinity	College	and	later	rector	of	Hurstmonceux,	in	
Sussex,	Hare	was	one	of	the	finest	German	scholars	in	England.	His	Rectory	
was said to contain more than two thousand books in German alone. By far his 
best-known work was Guesses at Truth, a collection of literary, philosophic, and 
religious	fragments,	jointly	composed	with	his	brother,	Augustus,	and	first	
[10]	published	anonymously	in	1827.	In	spite	of	its	distinctly	down-beat	title,	
it was to maintain an astonishing popularity throughout much of the century, 
going through a second, much enlarged, edition in 1838, a third in 1847, and 
being reprinted thereafter in 1867,1871 and 1884.
 Though most English contemporaries were reminded of the more 
familiar	maxims	of	Pascal	or	La	Bruyère,	to	anyone	familiar	with	the	Schlegels	
and the other Jena Romantics, the far greater debt to Germany is obvious. 
Responding to the comment of one of his colleagues, that he was ready to adopt 
the philosophy of “certain writers”6 because he admired their poetry, Hare is 
reported to have replied: “But poetry is philosophy and philosophy is poetry” 
(Memoir, Guesses xxii).
 Guesses at Truth intersperses	long	essays	on	specific	points	of	history,	
philology, and literary criticism with one-liners or religious and aesthetic topics. 
The essays are augmented and increase in number in later editions, constituting 
perhaps the best source of second-generation romantic critical theory in the 
English language, and developing ideas that are only latent or embryonic in the 
more famous Four Ages of Poetry by Peacock or Shelley’s Defence of Poetry. 
Above all is Hare’s sense of the changing nature of human consciousness:
          . . . Goethe in 1800 does not write just as Shakespeare wrote 
          in 1600: but neither would Shakespeare in 1800 have written just as 
           he wrote in 1600. For the frame and aspect of society are different; 
           the world which would act on him, and on which he would have 
           to act, is another world. True poetical genius acts in communion 
	 										with	the	world,	in	a	perpetual	reciprocation	of	influences	.	.	.	.	
           Genius is not an independent and insulated, but a social and 
           continental, or at all events a peninsular power . . . . (2 136-40)
	 If	we	allow	for	historical	development,	it	is	logical	also	to	allow	for	the	
incomplete and fragmentary nature of all our knowledge. For Hare a thing may 
be	complete	and	yet	unfinished;	or	finished	and	yet	incomplete.	This	distinction	
serves as a basis for a further distinction, that between the classic and gothic 
spirit:	“Is	not	every	Grecian	temple	complete	even	though	it	be	in	ruins?	.	.	.	.	Is	
not	every	Gothic	minster	unfinished?	and	for	the	best	of	reasons,	because	it	is	
infinite	.	.	.”	(2.250).
	 As	Maurice	was	quick	to	see,	his	mentor’s	architectural	example	
could	provide	an	excellent	metaphor	for	the	Bible	itself.	That	something	can	be	
at	once	finished,	but	by	its	very	nature	dynamically	incomplete,	was	a	concept	
that applied both to language, and, at another level, to the structure of all 
narrative—including	that	of	the	Bible.	In	a	letter	of	1863	he	distinguishes	three	
different ways in which he saw the eighteenth century had understood the Old 
Testament: [11]
	 										1)	The	purely	orthodox.	The	divine	history	is	in	its	essence	
	 										miraculous—i.e.,	it	is	an	exception	from	the	law	of	all	other	
          histories.
          2) The purely naturalistic. All the so-called miracles of Scripture 
	 									may	be	explained	into	ordinary	phenomena.
          3) The spiritualistic (either in the Romanist or Methodist form). 
          Miracles have not ceased. There are interferences now as there 
           were of old (Life 2.454)
 Turning to his own, nineteenth century, Maurice argues that Strauss and 
the “Mythical School,” even while they seemed to endorse the hard-headed 
naturalism of their eighteenth-century predecessors, Eichorn and Reimarus, had 
had	the	paradoxical	effect	of	subverting	the	second	of	these	schemes	in	that	they	
had demonstrated “that no records of human life can be content with purely 
naturalistic phenomena. There is always the dream of something transcendent.” 
But this is a two-edged weapon. Granted that if followed in one direction 
it	implies	all	history	is	based	on	falsehood,	but	“follow	it	to	its	extreme	in	the	
other	direction	and	you	come	to	the	true	supernatural	origin	of	history.”	In	
other words—much as George Steiner was to argue in his 1989 book, Real 
Presences—Maurice believed that the transcendent yearnings of everyday 
language are not part of the process of “projection,” by which humanity endows 
its universe with its own values (as Feuerbach and Strauss believed), but are a 
proper part of the sacramental nature of language. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, argues Maurice, the three theories of scriptural interpretation had 
in effect reached a stalemate, each unable to sustain itself unaided, yet 
fundamentally incompatible with the alternatives. All three should rather be seen 
as	expressions	of	a	much	deeper	perpetual	conflict	about	the	nature	of	language	
itself.	It	is,	by	its	nature,	incomplete:	possessing	“method,”	but	always	denying	
the	“systems”	that	would	provide	total	explanation.	Thus	language	is	never 
wholly to be accounted for by language, but always points beyond itself. 
Sounding at this point remarkably like Derrida, Maurice has a vision of the 
creativity of language in terms of perpetual incompleteness, always allowing for 
more to be said.7
 For Maurice, however, the special property of scripture is not just that 
it possesses a bi-focal or ambiguous quality straddling two worlds, but that it 
progressively reveals similar tendencies in the everyday world of the reader’s 
own	experience.	History—and,	supremely,	Biblical	history—shapes	and	
conditions the way we interpret the present: language is simultaneously vehicle 
and symbol of this process.
 Thus what begins as a theory of biblical interpretation, centring on the 
irruption of the divine into human history—what Eliot was to call “the still point 
of the turning world”—ripples out into all secular literature, providing a theory 
of creativity that refuses to place any boundary between the sacred and the 
[12] secular.	It	is	not	hard	to	see	how	such	a	view	would	appeal	to	someone	like	
the	deracinated	Congregational	minister,	George	MacDonald,	whose	slow	return	
to	Christian	orthodoxy	was	signalled	by	his	growing	friendship	with	Maurice,	
and	his	frequent	attendance	at	the	Vere	Street	Church	in	which	we	now	are.	The	
loss	of	the	original	grand	narrative	of	the	Christian	polity	was,	in	the	end,	to	be	
more than compensated for by the realisation that what was needed for his time 
was not de-mythologising, but re-mythologising—a recognition that the telling 
of stories lay at the very heart of what has been called “a story-shaped world.”
	 But	we	can,	I	think,	say	more.	Maurice	is	all	too	often	treated	as	
merely	a	figure	in	his	own	time—someone	who	exemplifies	rather	than	
transcends his own age, or even a saintly man with a second class intellect. 
I	have	argued	against	that	position	at	length	elsewhere,	and	this	is	no	place	to	
re-hash that case. But as the preceding passages have hinted, there is much in 
Maurice’s arguments that make more sense in our time than it did in his own. 
With hindsight, his contemporary reputation for obscurity owed much to the 
fact that his arguments mesh better with late twentieth-century criticism and. 
aesthetics than they did with the ideas of his own time. The trail of names 
and	comparisons	scattered	through	my	text	today	tell	their	own	story	both	of	
Maurice’s roots, and the direction of his ideas: Augustine, Dante, Kant, the 
Schlegels, Schleiermacher, Eliot, Sterner, Derrida. Maurice was strenuously 
engaged with the cutting edge of ideas in his own time, but he is also one of 
the very few nineteenth century thinkers whose ideas, like those perhaps of 
Coleridge	and	Schleiermacher,	may	yet	prove	to	be	at	least	as	relevant	for	the	
twenty	first	century	as	for	his	own.
Notes
1.	The	best	account	of	this	is	A.	O.	Loveday,	The Great Chain of Being.
2. See E. R. Goodenough, Introduction to Philo Judaeus, and	Henry	Chadwick,	“Philo.”
3.	Robert	Currie	et	al.	Churches and Churchgoers,
4. Peter Harrison, “Religion “ and the Religions in the English Establishment.
5. For a fuller account see Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, chapter 5.
6.	From	the	context	one	suspects	they	were	Wordsworth	and	Coleridge.
7. For a fuller discussion of the religious potential of Derrida’s arguments see Kevin Hart, 
The Trespass of the Sign. [13]
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